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One must look back to 1967 for the inaugural “Outer Space Treaty,” the first
and only binding multilateral agreement 1 for peaceful space use and
exploration. 2 In the subsequent fifty-four years, technologies and space
capabilities have evolved; therefore, an updated global treaty and agreement
should be developed and evaluated. Both China and Russia have demonstrated
their capabilities to degrade and/or destroy their respective adversaries’
satellites in space. 3 Space wars are no longer a hypothetical: the future once
discussed and anxiously anticipated after Sputnik I is here. While the United
States is maximizing efforts to protect and secure its satellites from harm, these
efforts may not be enough as international law on space security does not meet
today’s needs. Now more than ever, with space security and cybersecurity
realms intersecting, and with the achievement of adversarial space capabilities,
there is a need to review and update the Outer Space Treaty. 4 Recent weapons
testing and the resultant challenges to keeping satellites in orbit have
highlighted the glaring gaps in space governance. 5 This domain is ripe for new
review to prevent the weaponization of outer space and potential international
instability, and to secure satellites’ receipt and transfer of vital digital
information.

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
2411–12 [hereinafter “Outer Space Treaty”].
2
David Kuan-Wei Chen, New Ways and Means to Strengthen the Responsible and
Peaceful Use of Outer Space, 48 GA. J. INT’L & COMP L. 661, 664–65 (2019).
3
Sandra Erwin, Pentagon Report: China Amassing Arsenal of Anti-Satellite Weapons,
SPACENEWS (Sept. 1, 2020), https://spacenews.com/pentagon-report-china-amassingarsenal-of-anti-satellite-weapons/; see also Pavel Luzin, Russia is Behind in Military Space
Capabilities, But That Only Drives its Appetite, DEFENSENEWS (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/02/russia-is-behind-inmilitary-space-capabilities-but-that-only-drives-its-appetite/.
4
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1 (noting that the treaty was entered into force in
1967).
5
Maj. Liane Zivitski, China Wants to Dominate Space, and the US Must Take
Countermeasures, DEFENSENEWS (June 23, 2020), https://www.defensenews.com/
opinion/commentary/2020/06/23/china-wants-to-dominate-space-and-the-us-must-takecountermeasures/ (stating: “China is determined to replace the U.S. as the dominant power in
space. While proclaiming its peaceful intentions, Beijing’s doctrine considers space a
military domain, and it is investing heavily in space infrastructure designed to secure both
economic and military advantages. To ensure that it continues to compete from a position of
strength, the U.S. must invest sufficient resources in preparing its new Space Force to
defend America’s national interests and security in space.”).
1
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INTRODUCTION
When the Space Age was born with the Soviet Union’s successful launch of
Sputnik I in 1957, 6 no one could have predicted the vast array of satellites now
in orbit today or the myriad of ways in which satellites and space exploration
have affected and, in many ways, improved our terrestrial way of life. 7 Within
ten years of Sputnik I’s launch, the United Nations General Assembly agreed
to the Outer Space Treaty, which is still in force today. 8 The core focus of the
treaty is the use of space for peaceful purposes. 9 Fifty-four years later, this
treaty remains the sole international governance document of the space
domain, with, to date, 110 signatory countries. 10 Some obvious questions arise
when considering the Outer Space Treaty, such as how effective is this treaty
in allocating the rights and obligations of nations and other entities that are
using space now in ways that were beyond global imagination in 1967? 11 What
is “peaceful exploration”? This research will raise issues of potential treaty
gaps that should be considered, while negotiating a more comprehensive
regime of space use by terrestrial sovereign nations, with a view toward
updating the Outer Space Treaty.
The Sputnik I launch on October 4, 1957, galvanized immediate investment
6
See Sputnik 1, NASA (Oct. 14, 2011),
https://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/imagegallery/image_feature_924.html (stating: “On Oct.
4, 1957, Sputnik 1 successfully launched and entered Earth’s orbit. Thus, began the space
age. The successful launch shocked the world, giving the former Soviet Union the
distinction of putting the first human-made object into space. The word ‘Sputnik’ originally
meant ‘fellow traveler,’ but has become synonymous with ‘satellite’ in modern Russian.”).
7
World Space Week: Six Ways Satellites Improve Our Lives, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF
INDUS., SCI., ENERGY AND RES. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.industry.gov.au/news/worldspace-week-six-ways-satellites-improve-our-lives (stating, “As they orbit above us in space,
satellites are supporting more than 7 billion people down on Earth.”) [hereinafter “World
Space Week”].
8
Chen, supra note 2, at 664–65 (describing the inaugural Outer Space Treaty as a
binding multilateral agreement. The catalyst for international cooperation came thirteen
years earlier, when Sputnik I was launched by the Soviet Union. Fears of space wars rallied
the global community. The United Nations passed the 1967 global Outer Space Treaty).
9
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1 (acknowledging “the importance of
international co-operation in the field of activities in the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space.”).
10 G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), at 15 (1966) (“The treaty was signed in London. Moscow and
Washington on 27 January 1967.”). Twenty-three other signatories have yet to complete
ratification.
11 See Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50. Can it Survive a New Space
Race?, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
outer_space_treaty (noting that “unfortunately, there are a number of key treaty phases that
remain opaque” and that there has been no judicial enforcement to resolve the Treaty’s
ambiguous language).
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by the United States. 12 President Dwight Eisenhower intensified the US space
program in an effort to accelerate US advances in both space and weapons
programs. 13 Today, the US has launched more space assets than any other
country. 14 These activities, and those of Russia and China, collectively
illustrate the dramatic evolution of space activity and advances in the past
sixty-three years. They also demonstrate the necessity for a new evaluation of
the treaty’s usefulness in application. Status quo may have brought about a
false sense of international security.
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 recognizes “the common interest of all
mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes.” 15 The concept underlying peaceful purpose “. . . does not have an
authoritarian definition and continues to be a source of contention.” 16 Over
time, “peaceful purposes” uses has been interpreted to mean that “. . . outer
space can be used for both civilian and military non-aggression purposes.” 17
There have been no judicial interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty, so this
domain and its terminology remain subject to further interpretation. 18
Meanwhile alarms have been raised, especially by the recent Chinese and
Russian anti-satellite testing and their demonstration of potential dominance in
space. 19 Furthermore, nation states as well as commercial ventures, such as
SpaceX, desire assurances that their space assets and capitalist endeavors will
be protected and supported by national and international laws. 20

See Sputnik 1, supra note 6.
Id.; see also The Launch of Sputnik, 1957, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ARCHIVE,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/103729.htm (last visited May 12, 2021).
14 See NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTELLIGENCE CTR., COMPETING IN SPACE 5 (Dec. 2020),
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.PDF.
15 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
16 Chen, supra note 2, at 665–66.
17 Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
18 Id. at 665–66; see also MANFRED LACHS, THE L. OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN
CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 97 (Tanja Masson-Zwaan & Stephan Hobe eds., 2010)
(stating “there seems to be little doubt as to the real meaning of [the] words” peaceful
purpose, which purport to completely disarm and de-militarize space).
19 See Sandra Erwin, U.S. Space Command Again Condemns Russia Anti-Satellite
Missile, SPACENEWS (July 23, 2020), https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-command-againcondemns-russia-for-anti-satellite-weapon-test/. US Department of State raised concerns
over adversaries’ quests for dominance. For example, Christopher Ford, US Assistant
Secretary of State was quoted that the latest test “highlights Russia’s hypocritical advocacy
of outer space arms control, with which Moscow aims to restrict the capabilities of the
United States while clearly having no intention of halting its own counterspace program —
both ground-based anti-satellite capabilities and what would appear to be actual in-orbit
anti-satellite weaponry.” Id.
20 Victor L. Shammas & Tomas B. Holen, One Giant Leap for Capitalistkind: Private
Enterprise in Outer Space, 5 PALGRAVE COMM. 1, 4 (2019).
12
13
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While a useful treaty, there are gaps due to ambiguity in the terminology of
this half-century old Outer Space Treaty. This is due to technological advances
and to many nations and commercial entities participating in space
exploration. 21 Although most space exploration is not concerning, some
research activities have yielded pockets of concern. An updated treaty could
redefine the parameters and definitions of legitimate activity. For example, the
current definition of “peaceful exploration” 22 of the current treaty is difficult to
enforce under international law, especially with the change in world events and
the addition of newer global leaders. 23
Exactly half a century later, the world has changed, and so has
space. A bi-polar world has become multipolar, and an optimistic
period of multilateralism has given way to a decline in robust
international cooperation. Meanwhile, developments in outer space
have exploded in complexity, ambition, and commercial promise.
The number of entrants and potential entrants has
proliferated…One of the key new entrants is China [planning] a
permanent Chinese lunar colony as early as 2030. 24
Particularly revealing is the Preamble to the Outer Space Treaty, as the
General Assembly of the United Nations recognized at the 1499th Plenary
Meeting on December 19, 1966, that a discussion was captured in the record
that more definitions would be useful, if not essential in the future. 25 The
United Nations’ Resolution reads:
2222 (XXI) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies:
The General Assembly . . .
Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . .
(b) To begin at the same time the study of questions relative to the
definition of outer space and utilization of outer space and celestial
21 Reopening the American Frontier: Exploring How the Outer Space Treaty Will
Impact American Commerce and Settlement in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Space, Sci. & Competitiveness of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 105th Cong. 12,
84–85 (2017).
22 G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), at 15 (1966) (“Reaffirming the importance of international cooperation in the field of activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,
including Moon and other celestial bodies”).
23 ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN INT’L L. AS
EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE L. OF TREATIES 1–7 (Peggy Oscarsson
trans., Springer ed. 2007).
24 Melissa Durkee, The Future of Space Governance, 48 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 711,
711 (2019) (noting that in 2019, seventy-two nations had space agencies, and fourteen had
orbital launch capabilities).
25 G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), at 15 (1966).
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bodies; including various implications of space communications;
(c) To report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly at
its twenty-second session. 26
Accordingly, while the treaty’s signatory nations and the General Assembly
of the United Nations acknowledged their work had just begun and requested
further resolution, fifty years later there have been no additional definitions. 27
Why now? What has changed? Is there a renewed interest in the treaty? There
is increased awareness that space security is essential to global safety and
prosperity, and as such the time may have come to modernize the treaty to
reflect the world’s innovation in space.
In 2020, the steady progression of the weaponization of space continued,
unnoticed. Space is the newest theater of national strategic risk: space satellites
are no longer “safe” in orbit, and space assets have become real targets. 28
Space is a new frontier that the United States must defend; the United States is
a strong, global world leader, through its decades and centuries of
perseverance, toil, innovation, and ingenuity. This innovation must likewise be
applied to the space threats. One lesson learned from the COVID-19 pandemic
is that while preparation is key, prevention and eradication of threats are not
always possible. Thus, strategic risk mitigation is paramount for a healthy US
economy and national defense. Warnings of threats to space assets have been
present while not being truly heeded, like the global reaction to pandemic
warnings before the spread of the COVID-19 virus in 2020. 29
In 2020, the world was changed by more than just the pandemic: Russia
engaged in concerning space activity, which mimicked earlier equally
concerning space activity from China. 30 New threats to global space security
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at Preamble 4(b), (c).
Id. at art. XV (“Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this
Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the
amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the State Parties to the Treaty and
thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance of it.”).
28 U.S DEP’T OF DEF., DEF. SPACE STRATEGY SUMMARY 1 (June 2020),
https://media.defense.gov/ 2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/1/1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF (“In particular, China and
Russia present the greatest strategic threat due to their development, testing, and deployment
of counterspace capabilities and their associated military doctrine for employment in
conflict extending to space. China and Russia each have weaponized space . . . to reduce
U.S. and allied military effectiveness and challenge our freedom of operation in space.”)
[hereinafter “DEF. SPACE STRATEGY SUMMARY”].
29 Stuart Clark, ‘It’s Going to Happen’: Is the World Ready for War in Space?,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/apr/15/its-going-tohappen-is-world-ready-for-war-in-space.
30 See Marcus Weisgerber, Coronavirus Not Slowing Russian, Chinese Space Activities,
US General Says, DEF. ONE (May 12, 2020), https://www.defenseone.com/
26
27
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and global cybersecurity emerged through the testing of anti-satellite space
weapons as well as through cyberattacks. 31 Now both China and Russia have
sophisticated capabilities to harm space assets. On July 15, 2020, “Russia
conducted a non-destructive on-orbit test of a space-based anti-satellite
weapon,” declared General John “Jay” Raymond. 32 This is the same weapon
that General Raymond raised concerns over earlier in the year when a Russian
space craft maneuvered near a US government satellite. 33
If Russia or China engage in similarly adversarial maneuvers, the US is
concerned that there may not be many options to defend assets in space. 34 It
naturally raises the question: how can this significant emerging threat be
appropriately and legally addressed?
As part of its threat assessment, the US will evaluate its adversary’s
intentions, or at least what it can glean from its actions. For example, speaking
about the Russian space-based anti-satellite weapon, General Raymond
remarked, “[this] is further evidence of Russia’s continuing efforts to develop
and test space-based systems, and consistent with the Kremlin’s published
military doctrine to employ weapons that hold the U.S. and allied space assets
at risk.” 35 The intentions of Russia do not appear peaceful, but rather a quest
for dominance. 36 At some point, is an action in space deemed antagonistic or
deliberatively adversarial? Peaceful exploration seems incompatible with the
testing of space-based weapons and ground-based cyberattacks of satellites.
With dozens of countries, as well as private individuals and investors now
investing in space assets, experts suggest that the US and other countries
should re-evaluate these existing space laws. 37 At what point does research and
development border on treaty violation? When a country can sufficiently
demonstrate that testing a weapon 20,000 miles or more above the earth could
have adverse impacts to other satellites?

threats/2020/05/coronavirus-not-slowing-russian-chinese-space-activities-us-generalsays/165349/.
31 Clark, supra note 29.
32 Erwin, supra note 19 (quoting General Raymond, USAF, Commander, US Space
Command and Commander, Air Force Space Command).
33 Id.
34 See id. (stating that this cycle will lead to escalation of capabilities, and the types of
weapons that Russia tests puts the United States and other allies at risk).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Durkee, supra note 24, at 711–12 (“The SpaceX program is making rocket
launches available at bargain basement prices, bringing space activities within the reach of a
gaggle of startups keen to grab their piece of the commercial pie.”); see also Joanne I.
Gabrynowicz, Some Legal Considerations Regarding the Future of Space Governance, 48
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 739, 742 (2020) (acknowledging ambiguity in current construct).
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BACKGROUND

A. Who Owns Outer Space?
Who owns outer space? No one nor any nation state: “There is no
sovereignty in space.” 38 Although there is sovereignty on earth, the same does
not apply to space. 39 For over thirty-five years, the United Nations Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Subcommittee has grappled with
the question of where space begins. 40 The subcommittee notes that “[while
contentious,] some nations say this question must be answered.” 41 In 2001, the
US, however, adopted the official position that “defining or delimiting outer
space is not necessary . . . because [n]o legal or practical problems have arisen
in the absence of such a definition.” 42 According to Joanne I. Gabrynowicz,
some states prefer the ambiguity as “[o]ther nations say a formal delimitation
between air and space is unnecessary because everything is working well
now.” 43 But if it is no longer working well, what options exist?
Although outer space is, or could be, subject to international law,
enforcement and fora for disputes have not been explored or utilized. 44 With
the growing unease in space, legal concerns about effective enforcement are
emerging on earth. 45 US adversaries escalating their anti-satellite testing in
2020 has yielded new developments and concerns. This naturally results in
legal scholars and space experts reviewing the history of space treaties and
agreements to assess potential options for potential future recourse. 46
B. Where Does Space Begin?
With increasing use of the air space above the earth, an interesting and
probing question often comes to the forefront: where does outer space begin?
Gabrynowicz, supra note 37, at 742.
Id. at 742 n.16 (“Sovereignty is not the legal organizing principle in space as it is on
Earth and in airspace.”) (referencing Outer Space Treaty arts. I–II).
40 Id.
41 Id. (acknowledging that certain nations desire clarity to the “upper limit to
sovereignty,” while others say it is unnecessary).
42 Id. at 743 n.23 (quoting US Dep’t of State, US Statement, Definition and
Delamination of Outer Space and the Character and Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit,
Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
at its 40th Session in Vienna (2001)) (explaining that with the creation of US Space
Command, the official position of the US could be reviewed).
43 Id. at 742 (emphasis added).
44 Chen, supra note 2, at 663.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 667–68.
38
39
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Space governance can be “settle[d]” only if it is determined “where exactly
space begins.” 47 In the absence of a universal agreement, various countries are
now defining differently where space begins, as well as what a space object
actually is. For example, Australia defines a “space object” as something that
goes to or beyond one hundred kilometers above sea level, 48 and similarly,
Denmark defined “outer space” (vice space object) as above one hundred
kilometers above sea level. Compare this to Colombia’s assertion of its
sovereignty to its “territories” extending 35,786 kilometers above the Earth’s
equator. 49
In the absence of universally accepted definitions in an Outer Space Treaty,
sovereign states taking such opposing positions are potentially problematic.
Negotiating after nation states have asserted their positions does not bode well
for compromise. Consider the case of Colombia, which is has now codified its
aforementioned position into the Colombian Constitution. 50 Moreover, dispute
resolutions under international law would be inconsistent and yield different
results based on the countries involved. Such fluidity is not optimal for nation
states or private investors. 51
C. Space Law Beginning Somewhere: Spunik I Is Launched and the United
Nations Responds
International regulation began shortly after Sputnik I, which was launched
on October 4, 1957, by the Soviet Union. 52 This launch set off an alarm of
global proportions and the United Nations General Assembly (G.A.) was
called upon to act. 53 In 1957, the United Nations G.A. passed its first
resolution, which called for the “joint study of an inspection system designed

47
48

Durkee, supra note 24, at 714.
Gabrynowicz, supra note 37, at 743 (referencing Australia’s Space Activities Act

1998).
49 Id. (referencing Denmark’s Outer Space Act and Columbia’s Constitution, who chose
the metric of 35,786 kilometers because it is the distance from earth to the arc in the
geosynchronous orbit).
50 Id.
51 Id. (highlighting that in the United States, investors are likewise asking for assurances
for proper tax law application, as space is “not within U.S. jurisdiction.”).
52 Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, NASA (Nov. 19, 2020), https://history.
nasa.gov/sputnik.html (“. . .the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik I. . . . [t]hat
launch ushered in new political, military, technological, and scientific developments. While
the Sputnik launch was a single event, it marked the start of the space age and the U.S.U.S.S.R. space race.”).
53 António Guterres, Remarks on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Launch of Sputnik-1,
U.N. SEC’Y GEN. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-1004/sgs-sputnik-1-60th-anniversary-launch-remarks (“ . . .the launch of Sputnik-1 in 1957. . .
. marked the beginning of the Space Age.”).
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to ensure that the sending and launching of objects through outer space shall be
exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.” 54 Countries sought universal
consent that space activities be conducted in the interest of international peace,
as all humankind has a “common interest” in outer space. 55 Of particular note
is the Preamble of Resolution 1348 (XIII), which instructs all signatories to
avoid “the extension of present rivalries into this new field [of outer space].” 56
Despite the language in the Preamble, by 1962, the United Nations agreed to
assess new potential celestial threats to international peace, such as the safe
returning of astronauts who landed in foreign state waters. 57 The US
Representative to the United Nations was vocal in expressing concerns and
characterized the Soviet Union space activity this way in 1962:
Outer space is not a new subject; it is just a new place in which all
the old subjects come up. The things that go on in space are
intimately related to the things that go on here on earth. It would be
naïve to suppose that we can insulate outer space from other aspects
of human existence. 58
The Outer Space Treaty signatories agreed only to major principles;
concepts falling outside these principles remain unresolved. 59 Two principles
remain solid and unquestioned: (1) the treaty prohibits the placing of nuclear
54

See G.A. Res. 1148 (XII), at ¶ 1(f) (Nov. 14, 1957); see also Chen, supra note 2, at

664.
55 See G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), at ¶ 1 (Nov. 14, 1957); see also Chen, supra note 2, at
664–65.
56 See G.A. Res. 1348, supra note 55, at ¶ 1; see also Chen, supra note 2, at 664–65.
57 Elizabeth Howell, Who Owns the Moon? SPACE.COM (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.space.com/33440-space-law.html.
58 See Chen, supra note 2, at 662, n.1.
59 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER
SPACE AFFAIRS, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/
introouterspacetreaty.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2021).
[T]he basic framework on international space law, including the following
principles: the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the
benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all
mankind; outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States; outer
space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means; States shall not place
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial
bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner; the Moon and other
celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; astronauts
shall be regarded as the envoys of mankind; States shall be responsible for
national space activities whether carried out by governmental or nongovernmental entities; States shall be liable for damage caused by their space
objects; and States shall avoid harmfulcontamination of space and celestial
bodies.
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weapons in space, 60 and (2) the treaty prevents all nations from claiming
sovereignty of outer space or any celestial body. 61
Other principles have been subject to ambiguity in application. Article II
limits the Moon and all other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes only and
establishes that space shall be free for exploration and use by all nations. 62
Also, Article IV specifically prohibits parties from placing weapons “in orbit
around the Earth” with the absolute prohibition of “any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.” The
treaty explicitly prohibits any installation of “such weapons on celestial bodies
. . . in outer space in any other manner.” 63 The treaty’s prohibition of placing
nuclear weapons in space remains its most important principle. Further, Article
IV states that the Moon and other celestial bodies must be explored for
“exclusively peaceful purposes” with an express prohibition on the
“establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications.” 64
Interestingly, the treaty forbids “military maneuvers on celestial bodies,” but it
deems that “[t]he use of military personnel for scientific research shall not be
prohibited.” 65 Therefore, the treaty is explicit that all peaceful exploration must
be permitted. 66
Accordingly, one will find ambiguities in common definitions and
applications, and resolution is unlikely notwithstanding exponential growth in
space activities and threats.
D. United States Creation of Space Command
Naturally, because attacks on US satellites are possible, there is concern
about the potential impacts such an attack would have on daily life. 67 All lives
in the US would be partially impacted by satellite attacks because the US
broadly depends on satellites and their secure transmission of data for many

60 Chen, supra note 2, at 667 (referencing Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty); see
also Gabrynowicz, supra note 37, at 741–42 (summarizing international discussions on
potential future treaty activity, but none pertaining to revising the nuclear weapon
probation).
61 Gabrynowicz, supra note 37, at 741–42.
62 See Durkee, supra note 24, at 714.
63 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. (“. . . any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon
and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.”); see also Chen, supra note 2, at 661.
67 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NAT’L SPACE POL’Y OF THE U.S.A. 1 (2020) (“Our way
of life on Earth is greatly enhanced by space and the United States acknowledges the
importance of space to the advancement of all humanity.”).
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critical infrastructure sector services. 68 With both China and Russia
demonstrating their potential, but unverified, capability to destroy US
satellites, action is needed. 69 While no longer racing to get into space first, the
US is exploring all international and military options to protect and secure
space satellites from harm. 70
The use of the military is one avenue. For example, one military option is to
centralize defense space activities under common leadership and control,
should a military response become necessary. 71 Accordingly, the United States
Space Command was formed in 2020 to “organize, train, and
equip space forces in order to protect U.S. and allied interests in space and to
provide space capabilities to the joint forces,” in an effort to invest in national
defense beyond borders and earth’s atmosphere. 72 The US has a particular
reliance on the companies that support the Pentagon, frequently referred to as
the “defense industrial base” by policy makers. 73 As such, a broader coalition
across government and the private sector is necessary if genuine attention and
change has an opportunity to flourish.

68 Richard Hollingham, What Would Happen if All Satellites Stopped Working?, BBC
(June 9, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20130609-the-day-without-satellites.
69 See NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 14, at 1.
70 DEF. SPACE STRATEGY SUMMARY, supra note 28 (“Ensuring the availability of these
capabilities is fundamental to establishing and maintaining military superiority across all
domains and to advancing U.S. and global security and economic prosperity.”).
71 Id.
The Department is taking innovative and bold actions to ensure space
superiority and to secure the Nation’s vital interests in space now and in the
future. Establishing the U.S. Space Force (USSF) as the newest branch of our
Armed Forces and the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) as a unified
combatant command, as well as undertaking significant space acquisition
reform across the DoD, has set a strategic path to expand space power for the
Nation.
72 Staff Sgt. Brittany E. N. Murphy, CSO Visits VAFB During MMIII Launch, U.S.
SPACE COMMAND (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.spacecom.mil/MEDIA/NEWSARTICLES/Article/2303349/cso-visits-vafb-during-mmiii-launch/.
73 Mikhail Grinberg, The Defense Industrial Base of the Future, CNAS (July 23, 2020),
https://www.cnas.org/ publications/commentary/the-defense-industrial-base-of-the-future.
Since America relies on critical infrastructure that is primarily owned and operated by
the private sector, the government cannot defend the nation alone. The public and
privatesectors, along with key international partners, must collaborate to build national
resilience and reshape the cyber ecosystem in a manner that increases its security, while
imposing costs against malicious actors and preventing attacks of significant
consequence.
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Opportunity to Leverage US Business Interests

Another avenue to increase attention to the risks of satellite attacks is to
focus business leaders’ attention as they explore their own commercial
interests as well as their security. 74 The public sector and academia provide the
framework for prosperity in the United States. 75 In 2019, the US Gross
Domestic Product was $21.43 trillion, the largest in the world. 76 The strength
of the US economy is largely due to the US Constitution and the rule of law, to
the reserved authorities of state and local governments, to the commercial
incentives available to the private sector, and to the US’s robust educational
system. With such global ranking, there is tremendous influence and an
opportunity to lead in the international arena. The private sector is being
leveraged more and more to help drive change and demand security in space. 77
The US economy runs and relies on private enterprise. In fact, it is estimated
that the private sector owns and operates somewhere between 60 and 80
percent of the digital infrastructure, the indispensable highway upon which
almost all our commerce is conducted. 78 In the US, sixteen business areas are
designated as “critical infrastructure sectors,” which are all primarily managed
and operated by American commercial enterprises. 79 A critical infrastructure
sector, as defined by Presidential Policy Directive 21, includes the business
assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, that are “considered
so vital to the United States” that their incapacitation or destruction would
have a “debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national

74 See Diane M. Janosek, Critical Infrastructure: Space Security and Cybersecurity
Intersect, CAPITOL TECH. U., https://www.captechu.edu/blog/part-1-critical-infrastructurespace-security-and-cybersecurity-intersect (last visited May 12, 2021).
75 See id.
76 See Gross Domestic Product 2019, WORLD BANK (July 1, 2020), https://databank.
worldbank.org/ data/download/GDP.pdf; see also Janosek, supra note 74.
77 See Mike Wall, New Space Mining Legislation is ‘History in the Making’, SPACE.COM
(Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.spacecom/31177-space-mining-commercial-spaceflightcongress.html (noting that the investment in space activities is growing, and that with such
investments, investors want assurances and a “solid framework.”).
78 Marguax Constantin et al., As National Borders Consider Reopening, a Partnership
Between Governments and the Tourism Industry Will Be Essential, MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug.
5, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/ travel-logistics-and-transportinfrastructure/our-insights/reimagining-the-9-trillion-tourism-economy-what-will-it-take#
(noting that the exact percentage in the United States has not been determined, but
government officials generally reference this 60 to 80 percent estimate); see also Janosek,
supra note 74.
79 Critical Infrastructure Sectors, CYBERSEC. & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY (Oct.
21, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors#:~:text=Presidential%
20Policy%20Directive%2021%20%28PPD-21%29%3A%20Critical%20Infrastructure%
20Security,7.%20Guidance%20on%20the%20Essential%20Critical%20Infrastructure%20
Workforce.
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public health or safety, or any combination thereof.” 80 All of these sectors, to
some degree, rely on secure cyber networks that increasingly obtain their
information from US satellites. 81
F. Essential Assets: US Critical Infrastructure Sectors
During the COVID-19 pandemic, President Donald Trump and the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security declared that workers in sixteen
critical infrastructure sectors are essential workers. 82 Dr. Brad Sims, President
of Capitol Technology, remarked: “[from] the most basic aspects of life—
having clean air to breathe and water to drink—to the more complex—
coordinating airplane traffic and securing nuclear reactors, life as we know it
depends on these 16 critical infrastructure [sectors.]” 83 The sixteen sectors are:
Chemical, Commercial Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing,
Dams, Defense Industrial Base, Emergency Services, Energy, Financial
Services, Food and Agriculture, Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public
Health, Information Technology, Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste,
Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems. 84
Therefore, daily life in the US would be severely impacted by an attack on
its space assets, as all of the above critical infrastructure sectors have a reliance
and strict dependence on space satellites. 85 If any one of the above sectors
experienced a ‘hit’ to a satellite upon which it relied, a degradation or complete
cessation of service would occur; and possibly a national emergency would
ensue. 86

80 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Policy
Directive—Critical Infrastructure Sec. & Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policydirective-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil; see also Janosek, supra note 74.
81 See World Space Week, supra note 7 (identifying six everyday things that satellites
affect: agriculture, weather forecasting, urban living, communications, entertainment, and
shopping).
82 See Advisory Memorandum from CISA Acting Director Brandon Wales on Ensuring
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers’ Ability to Work During the COVID-19 Response
(Dec. 16, 2020).
83 Janosek, supra note 74.
84 Critical Infrastructure Sectors, supra note 79.
85 See DEF. SPACE STRATEGY SUMMARY, supra note 28, at 1 (stating adversaries’
technological advances are “create[ing] challenges in protecting critical technology,
ensuring operational security, and maintaining strategic advantages.”).
86 See id. at 3 (noting that China and Russia have “analyzed U.S. dependencies on
space” and have “weaponized space as a way to deter and counter a possible U.S.
intervention during a regional military conflict”).
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G. US Space and Satellite Investments
All of these US critical infrastructures sectors rely on space and satellite
technology in some way, e.g., for Global Positioning System (GPS), time,
location, weather, and traffic. Common users of data transmitted by satellite
are automated teller machines (ATMs), video conferencing, satellite television
and radio, inventory control, pay-at-pump gas stations, telephone and
broadband, air traffic control systems, sea navigation systems, and the
navigation features people use in their autos every day. 87 The list is endless.
Satellites provide safety, ease, and convenience; daily life depends on space
and satellite security. 88
The critical infrastructure sector’s reliance on satellites means that all of
them require cybersecurity and other forms of protection. 89 Freedoms are
maintained with this protection. How is the United States prepared and
protected in space from cyberattacks? 90 What really happens in space when
space security and cybersecurity intersect?
While satellites are launched in different orbits at difererent distances from
the earth, there is connected ground station that processes the data collected
and/or transmitted by the satellite. During the transmission or processing
phases, the ground states can be subject to cyber attacks. Depending on the
type and/or functionality of the satellite, adversaries’ interests may be piqued,
and lead to greater cyberattacks due to the sensitvity of the data being
transmitted. 91 There are four principal purposes of the satellites, which are:
87 See generally World Space Week, supra note 7 (identifying six everyday things that
satellites affect: agriculture, weather forecasting, urban living, communications,
entertainment, and shopping).
88 See id. (noting that satellites benefit “7 billion people on Earth” and that they provide
us with “incredible benefits and worlds of opportunity”).
89 U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N., CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N. REP. 4–6
(2020), https://www.solarium.gov/report (recommending actions to “reshape the cyber
ecosystem,” operationalize cybersecurity collaboration with the private sector,” and
“preserve and employ the military instrument of national [power.]”); see also DEF. SPACE
STRATEGY SUMMARY, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that the Department of Defense is “taking
innovative and bold actions to ensure space superiority and to secure the Nation’s vital
interests in space now and in the future”).
90 U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N., supra note 89, at 98.
. . . [T]he U.S. government should focus on national critical functions that: (1)
[d]irectly support or underpin national security programs or government or
military operations; (2) [c]onstitute essential economic functions or underpin
the national distribution of goods and services; (3) [s]upport or underpin public
health and safety or are so foundational that their disruption could endanger
human life on a massive scale.
91 Types of Satellites: What is a Satellite, Types and Uses of Satellites, EDUCBA.COM
(Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.educba.com/types-of-satellites/; see also 7 Key Benefits of
Satellite Communication You Must Know, TELECOM TECH OUTLOOK (Sept. 7, 2020),
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intelligence,
surveillance,
reconnaissance
and
remote
sensing;
92
communications, navigation, and science and technology. Thus, as the US
has the greatest reliance in space, it also has the most to lose. 93 Space security
is a strategic imperative for US sovereignty and national security. 94 Clarity in
space governance is equally as imperative.
H. US Satellites in Orbit
In 2020, the US had hundreds of satellites in orbit, including 353
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaisance and remote sensing; 391
communications; thirty-one navigational; ninety-four science and
technological. 95 And yet with all these US sovereign resources in orbit, as well
as other countries’ satellites in orbit, is there truly useful, enforceable
protection in international law if a nation state or non-state actor became
adversarial in space? The applicability and enforcement of the Outer Space
Treaty may not be reliable, as in the time since its ratification “the world has
changed, and so has space.” 96 The weaponization of space is now here.
As an analogy, if an unarmed person is engaged in an unfriendly encounter
with an armed person whose intentions are unknown, what options does the
unarmed person have for protection? Not many, except to stay away and keep
one’s distance. For outer space, the option to “stay away” is not available as
satellites are in fixed orbits, and there is no self-defense (at least not yet
developed) for adversarial attacks such as projectiles or anti-satellite weapons
launched from a neighboring satellite. International space governance may be
the only option. Thus, the “absence of conflicts in space in the past is not
guaranteed in the future.” 97

https://www.telecomtechoutlook.com/news/7-key-benefits-of-satellite-communication-youmust-know-nwid-254.html (noting what an artificial satellite is and the various functions
they serve).
92 See NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 14, at 4 (noting countries and
organizations with assets in space and the primary purposes of said assets).
93 See id. at 1, 4 (a descriptive visual of United States assets in space and noting how
other world powers are challenging US superiority in space).
94 DEF. SPACE STRATEGY SUMMARY, supra note 28, at 1 (explaining how countries such
as China and Russia have weaponized space to potentially harm the US and other closely
related allies).
95 See NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 14, at 6–7.
96 Durkee, supra note 24, at 711.
97 Chen, supra note 2, at 673, 681 (quoting Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Rep. of Work of Its Sixty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/20, at ¶ 50–69 (July 3,
2019) (“the absence of conflicts in space in the past could not be regarded as a guarantee of
peace.”)).
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II. THE VOID IN SPACE GOVERNANCE WITH REGARD TO
RESPONSIBLE AND PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE
A. Can One Enforce Space Governance?
Conflicts in space are likely to occur, especially with the involvement of
new nations. 98 Enforcement of international law of the Outer Space Treaty has
never been exercised. 99 As a United Nations observer noted, “The absence of
conflicts in space in the past [can] not be regarded as a guarantee of peace.” 100
So what can assist in guaranteeing peace? Is there not a duty to seek peace by
world leaders to preserve peaceful exploration and non-militarization of space?
While the United Nations seeks to find common voluntary resolutions, it has
been unsuccessful in its attempts to arrive at any international agreement to
update space governance and fill in the gaps identified by current anti-satellite
activity. 101 However, most emerging issues, such as space mining rights by
commercial entities seeking rare and valuable minerals through space
exploration with the intent to salvage and return discovered minerals to earth,
are addressed by individual countries. 102 The most successful space agreement
pertains to the International Space Station and how it allocates rights and
expenses to the fifteen member nations. 103 At the international level, the
Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group was
established with representatives from government, civil society, industry, and
academia. 104 The group has made some progress and adopted “Building
Blocks for the Development of International Framework on Space Resources
Activities.” 105 Countries are exploring whether there can be a voluntary
agreement on extracted space resources. 106 Looking even further ahead, to
another unresolved issue, is how countries will cooperate if human beings land
and then reside on the moon; with no sovereignty in space, earthly sovereignty

98 See generally G.A. RES. 72/250, ¶ 3 (Jan. 12, 2018) (highlighting practical measures
for the prevention of an arms race in space); Chen, supra note 2, at 673.
99 Chen, supra note 2, at 669.
100 Id. at 673, 681 (quoting Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of Work
of Its Sixty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/20, at ¶ 54 (July 3, 2019)).
101 See Howell, supra note 57 (listing the four UN treaties enacted to support the Outer
Space Treaty, including The Rescue Agreement of 1968, The Liability Convention of 1972,
The Registration Convention of 1975, and The Moon Agreement of 1979).
102 See Wall, supra note 77 (discussing space mining and if a country can assert or retain
‘property rights’ to rare minerals extrapolated from the moon and other celestial bodies).
103 Id. (highlighting a recent bill that extends US commitment to the International Space
Station through at least 2024).
104 Gabrynowicz, supra note 37, at 746.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 745.
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approaches and claims to sovereignty are not applicable. 107 How would
disputes involving this issue be resolved?
B. Without A Guarantee of Peace, Is the United States Prepared?
Space is becoming a “place” where countries can assert dominance over one
another by destroying or degrading another’s space assets, which in turn,
causes terrestrial impacts. 108 Outer space is the next battlefield, 109 as well as
the emerging hottest sector for commercialization and investment. 110
Dependence on space technologies can have a devastating impact if those
technologies are under attack. What if an adversary attacked US satellites, like
China did to its own weather satellite? What if Russia attempted to
demonstrate that it could? What effect could such an attack have on daily lives
in both the immediate and medium term? An evaluation of satellite uses yields
a definite dependence on technology. What if just one significant satellite
started to fail?
When and if a satellite is attacked, the initial challenge will be proper
attribution to a specific actor or nation state. As no one can “see” an attack in
space, it would be difficult to ascertain an actor. Possibly, only a retrospective
review could assist if there was collection technology, which had the necessary
data with enough fidelity and precision. 111 Adding to the difficulty is that
generally, satellite failure becomes known only when there is a terrestrial
technology alert or degradation of service; thus, it is not necessarily in real
time that a country could assess a suspected attack. 112 Terrestrial impacts may
include: [t]elevision networks no longer able to broadcast, an internet
degradation or failure, denial of service, and ATMs malfunctioning. 113
Id. at 742.
See NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 14, at 1, 3 (explaining that
hijacking of another’s space asset is now technologically possible).
109 Zivitski, supra note 5 (stating “space is the new high ground in great power
competition”).
110 Shammas & Holen, supra note 20, at 13 (“No longer terra nullius, space is now the
new terra firma of capitalistkind: its naturalized terroir, its next necessary terrain. The logic
of capitalism dictates that capital should seek to expand outwards into the vastness of space.
. . .”).
111 John Klein, To Deter Attacks on Satellites, U.S. Needs a Strategy to Identify Bad
Actors, SPACENEWS (June 5, 2020), https://spacenews.com/op-ed-to-deter-attacks-onsatellites-u-s-needs-a-strategy-to-identify-bad-actors/ (explaining that attribution is
necessary in order to appropriately respond to hostile or malicious action).
112 See Leonard David, Russian Satellite Hit By Debris from Chinese Anti-Satellite Test,
SPACE.COM (Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.space.com/20138-russian-satellite-chinesespace-junk.html.
113 See NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 14, at 8.
107
108
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Financial networks that depend on exact timing provided by GPS technology
would freeze, and some traffic and railroad signals that also rely on GPS
technology would malfunction; additionally, air traffic control, reliant on GPS
and weather information plants, would fail. 114
Action is always better than reaction. In outer space today, however,
reaction may be the only option. US Congressman Jim Bridenstine accurately
assessed the lack of options when he said, “If someone attacks us in space, we
reserve the right to respond terrestrially.” 115 This approach is not optimal for
international and US national security. 116 Thus, signatories may be forced to
address matters unilaterally or bilaterally, absent an international agreement. 117
III. ARE THE CURRENT THREATS TO THE US CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE VALID CONCERNS?
A. Adversarial Tactics
Foreign competitors and adversaries can conduct electronic attacks to
disrupt, deny, deceive, or degrade space services by attacking the segments in
space, on the ground, or through the user or the links themselves. 118
These threats take multiple forms. The first is jamming, which is a method
used to prevent users from receiving intended signals. Jamming can be
accomplished by two primary methods, uplink jamming (directed toward the
satellite) or downlink jamming (directed at the users on the ground). 119 The
second is spoofing, which is a method used to make data or signals appear to
be legitimate when they are not. This could tragically hurt an operation when
knowing the location of something or someone is the key to a successful
mission. 120 The Center for Advanced Defense, a non-profit defense-related
think tank on global security and conflict issues, reported in 2019 that Russia
conducted nearly 10,000 GPS spoofing incidents in 2018. 121 The report Above
See id. at 15.
Krause, supra note 11.
116 DEF. SPACE STRATEGY SUMMARY, supra note 28, at 1 (“Ensuring the availability of
these capabilities is fundamental to establishing and maintaining military superiority across
all domains and to advancing U.S. and global security and economic prosperity.”).
117 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 67, at 3–4 (“The United States considers the
space systems of all nations to have the right to pass through and conduct operations in
space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems, including
supporting infrastructure, will be considered an infringement of a nation’s rights.”).
118 See NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 14, at 15.
119 See CTR. FOR ADVANCED DEF., ABOVE US ONLY STARS: EXPOSING GPS SPOOFING IN
RUSS. AND SYRIA 9–10 (Nov. 2018), https://www.c4reports.org/aboveusonlystars.
120 Id. at 9.
121 Id. at 3.
114
115
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us Only Stars: Exposing GPS Spoofing in Russia and Syria found that those
incidents put ships off course and kept drones out of sensitive air space. 122 It is
notable that Russian spoofing is widespread. As the report concluded,
“[w]hether for profit, protection, or disruptions, illicit actors, writ large, stand
to gain from the proliferation of these capabilities.” 123
Accordingly, this raises the legal issue of whether spoofing and jamming
meets the definition of “peaceful purpose.” These new and novel ways to
compromise space assets may have reached the limits of any “peaceful
exploration of space” claim. 124 As such, this expansion in space activities calls
into question the reach of key phrases in the Outer Space Treaty. In as much as
some technologies today were not even in the scientific community’s
vernacular at the time of the passage of the treaty, 125 one would be hard
pressed to associate current interpretations and boundaries with these activities.
Absent clarity on interpretation, cyberattack violations would be challenging to
assert, and enforcement would become impossible, thus diminishing the
utilitarian value of the Outer Space Treaty. 126
B. Case Studies: China & Russia
The Outer Space Treaty provides for “peaceful exploration” in space. 127
The exemplars below are real time case studies on whether the activity
conducted by China and Russia is permissible, and whether current activities
can be construed as engagements for a peaceful purpose. 128 If one concludes
that these activities are definitively peaceful, then the Outer Space Treaty
should be re-visited and adjusted. 129 Such activities will continue to take place,
if not increase and/or proliferate, and they will do so without proper
governance. 130 International law is not the optimal enforcement mechanism
when facts and legal application are gray. 131 Considering multiple nation
states rely on peaceful and lawful use of space for satellite use, clear
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 51.
124 Id. at 26.
125 Id. at 3 (“spoofing” in terms of disruptions of satellite functionality is new and the
disruption capability did not previously exist).
126 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
127 Id. at art. IV
128 Id.
129 Krause, supra note 11.
130 Id.
131 Jana Maftei & Coman Varvara, Interpretation of Treaties, 8 ACTA UNIVERSITATIS
DANUBIUS 16, 16 (2012) (stating the challenge that presents in treaties in the “imprecision of
used terms” which then requires legal interpretation).
122
123
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boundaries are necessary. 132 Long-term safety and sovereignty could be in
question.
1.

China

Back in 2007, China demonstrated how space can become a combat zone by
conducting an anti-satellite mission test. 133 The country shot down its own
weather satellite with a kinetic kill vehicle. 134 China sent a clear message to the
world: satellites can be destroyed from Earth. Additionally, open-source
material confirms that the nascent capability has matured with greater
precision. 135 Major Liane “Trixie” Zivitski, of the United States Air Force,
currently serving as J32 Chief of Operations Branch, reported in a publication
that the kinetic kill vehicle is now assessed as operational and capable of
targeting low-orbit satellites. 136 There is also evidence, according to Zivitski,
that China may be developing up to three different anti-satellite missiles.
Further, on May 5, 2020, there was a reported Chinese launch of the Long
March-5B rocket, the design of which is suspected to be for transport into
space. 137 Such weapons testing immediately caused tremendous space
debris. 138 The volume of space debris alone will have residual effects for at
least two decades, as both small and large pieces of the destroyed satellite
remain in outer space in more than one orbit. 139
Even the smallest specimen of space debris can have devasting impacts on a
satellite if lodged—as one can imagine, there is no self-help or nearby human
132 Krause, supra note 11 (noting the rise of commercial rockets that could take private
“tourists” to space, which may require more specific boundaries to be drawn).
133 See Zivitski, supra note 5.
134 Id.
135 See generally id. (“Beijing’s rapidly improving [space] capabilities. . . are clear to see.”)
136 See id.
China is determined to replace the U.S. as the dominant power in space. While
proclaiming its peaceful intentions, Beijing’s doctrine considers space a military
domain, and it is investing heavily in space infrastructure designed to secure both
economic and military advantages. To ensure that it continues to compete from a
position of strength, the U.S. must invest sufficient resources in preparing its new
Space Force to defend America’s national interests and security in space.
137 Id.
138 See Mike Gruss, U.S. Official: China Turned to Debris-field ASAT Tests Following
2007 Outcry, SPACENEWS (Jan. 11, 2016), https://spacenews.com/u-s-official-china-turnedto-debris-free-asat-tests-following-2007-outcry/#:~:text=11%2C%202007%2C%
20China%20deliberately%20destroyed,used%20belt%20of%20Earth%20orbit (quoting
State Department that the 2007 anti-satellite test by the Chinese military a “remarkable
incident of irresponsible behavior” and that the 2007 “action, which was widely
condemned throughout the international space community, left a cloud of potentially
hazardous debris in a heavily used belt of Earth orbit.”); see also David, supra note 112.
139 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV.
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being to dislodge the space debris. 140 A millimeter particle can have
debilitating effects on an innocent “bystander satellite” owned by a different
sovereign nation. 141 Some say that these flagrant activities may very well be
clear indicators that the Chinese “are determined to replace the U.S. as the
dominant power in space.” 142 Six years after the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite
launch, on January 22, 2013, a Russian satellite was impacted by its space
debris. 143 The collision involved the Chinese “space junk” and Russia’s small
Ball Lens In The Space (BLITS) retroreflector satellite. 144 The BLITS was
only seventeen pounds, and it began immediate degradation with a change in
spin cycle from 5.6 seconds to 2.1 seconds. 145 As expected, attribution is
challenging, and to this day, Russia has not been compensated nor has China
admitted that its space debris caused the damage. 146 This article does not opine
on this conclusion, but rather asks if these activities are “peaceful exploration.”
2.

Russia

On July 15, 2020, Russia conducted a non-destructive on-orbit test of a
space-based anti-satellite weapon. 147 Russia used one satellite to “attack”
another: a “projectile” was released from Russian satellite Kosmos 2543
toward Russian satellite Kosmos 2542. 148 The Russians, however, deny this
was an anti-satellite weapon test and assert it was an “inspection” mission. 149
The testing of the anti-satellite weapon worried global leaders almost

140 See Neel V. Patel, Astronauts on the ISS are Hunting for the Source of Another
Mystery Air Leak, MIT TECH. R. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.
com/2020/09/30/1009150/astronauts-iss-hunting-mystery-air-leak-micrometeoroids/
(experiencing recent leaks due to space debris, the International Space Station is one
example of the challenge caused by a small leak to a space asset because the origination
and/or cause is extremely difficult to discover).
141 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV.
142 See Zivitski, supra note 5.
143 See David, supra note 112.
144 See id.
145 Wall, supra note 77; David, supra note 112.
146 Wall, supra note 77; David, supra note 112.
147 Evan Gough, Russia Just Tested an Anti-Satellite Weapon, UNIVERSE TODAY (July 28,
2020), https://www.universetoday.com/147182/russia-just-tested-an-anti-satellite-weapon/.
148 Id.
149 See Larisa Brown, Russia Fires ‘Star Wars’ Missile: Britain and US Brand Kremlin
Launch of First-Ever Anti-Satellite Weapon in Space a ‘Threat to Peace’, DAILY MAIL (July
23, 2020), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8553793/Putin-tests-anti-satelliteweapon-space-UK-say-Russia-threatened-peace-space.html (quoting a UK defense source
stating: “This is using a satellite as a space weapon. It is a step in the direction of turning space
into a new frontline.”).
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immediately. 150 Russia launched one satellite, Kosmos 2542, and then eleven
days later had the second satellite separate from the first. 151 The second
satellite, Kosmos 2543, released a projectile weapon eight months later. 152 It
was a novel, very deliberate weapon testing in many ways and is still being
studied. 153 Experts have now assessed that the July 2020 anti-satellite testing
by Russia is notable from many perspectives: nation-state sovereignty,
diplomatic relations, treaty enforcement, military capabilities, academic
advances, as well as the pure technological changes. 154 As such, these aspects
all raise alarms.
3.

Review of Two Case Studies

Now that two nation states not allied with the US can and have tested space
satellites as weapons, what is at risk? The US has more satellites and
equipment in space than any other nation. 155 Each of these space assets
transmits sensitive data that makes them potential targets for US adversaries to
hack or destroy. 156 Once again, this article does not opine on this conclusion,
but rather asks if these activities are “peaceful exploration.” 157
The two case studies of China and Russia, therefore, at a minimum, lead one
to infer that the Outer Space Treaty is not adequate enough to account for
technology changes and sophistication arising from the past five decades. 158
The extensive space debris caused by the Chinese ASAT SC-19 alone has
potential repercussions for decades to come, because the space debris will
continue to orbit for some time, and each orbit has the potential to “hit”
another sovereign country’s satellite. 159 What remedies, if any, are afforded to
150 See id. (“The weapon’s debris alone threatens the satellites the world depends on,
according to the head of the UK military’s space directorate.”)
151 Id.
152 Jonathan O’Callaghan, Russia Accused Of Firing ‘Anti-Satellite Weapon’ From One
Of Its Satellites In Space, FORBES (July 24, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jonathanocallaghan/2020/07/24/worrisomerussia-accused-of-firing-a-projectile-in-spacefrom-one-of-its-satellites/?sh=1b811c8865a5.
153 Id.
154 See Hollie McKay, Space Force on Alert: Behind Russia’s Mysterious Testing of
Deadly Anti-Satellite Weapons in Orbit, FOX NEWS (July 29, 2020),
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/space-force-russia-orbit-anti-satellites-testing.print.
155 Katharina Buchholz, The Countries with the Most Satellites in Space, STATISTA (July
14, 2020), https://www.statista.com/chart/17107/countries-with-the-most-satellites-inspace/#:~:text=While%20the%20U.S.%20is%20the,cooperations%20come%20in%20third
%20place.
156 See NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 14, at 6.
157 See Zivitski, supra note 5.
158 See id.; see also Gough, supra note 147.
159 See Zivitski, supra note 5; see also The Posture of the U.S. Strategic Command Before
Strategic Forces Subcommittee, 110th Cong. 12 (2007) (statement of General James Cartwright).
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that impacted country? As mentioned above, Congressman Bridenstine
assessed the lack of options if attacked: “If someone attacks us in space, we
reserve the right to respond terrestrially.” 160 Terrestrial responses mean that a
war started in space may also become a ground war, and with all domains
impacted, this could mean global “all-out” war. No sovereign state desires this
outcome. As of today, however, there are few alternatives if there are
aggressions in space. Accordingly, the time is ripe for a review and update of
outer space governance documents.
4.

Call to Action

The above case studies support the notion that the global landscape and
technologies have dramatically altered since 1957, when the first satellite was
launched. 161 The US National Space Policy recognizes that cyber defense and
education are integral to a strong long-term space strategy. 162 Likewise, the US
National Cyber Strategy recognizes that robust cyber education for the youth is
imperative for the nation’s future pipeline of cyber professionals. 163 Whether it
is about assets in space or cyber networks attacking those space assets, there
are three key elements to US policy success in this emerging arena:
Collaboration, Education, and Innovation—all across the space governance
(legal) paradigm. 164
a.

Collaboration

In outer space, no one country can completely “go it alone.” 165 The United
Krause, supra note 11.
See Shammas & Holen, supra note 20, at 5 (signing the 2010 National Space Policy,
President Barack Obama emphasized “promoting and supporting a competitive U.S.
commercial space sector” considered vital to continued progress in space); see also EXEC.
OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 67, at 5; see also Clara Moskowitz, How Sputnik
Changed the World 55 Years Ago Today, SPACE.COM (OCT. 4, 2012),
https://www.space.com/17894-sputnik-anniversary-changed-the-world.html.
162 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 67, at 7–8 (espousing the goal to
“incorporate cybersecurity principles across all phases of space systems design,
development, acquisition, and deployment” so that newly built space assets can be defended
from cyber-attacks).
163 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NAT’L CYBER STRATEGY OF THE U.S.A. 6 (Sept. 2018),
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_
SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF.
164 Id. at 1–2.
165 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 67, at 1.
Our way of life on Earth is greatly enhanced by space and the United States
acknowledges the importance of space to the advancement of all humanity.
160
161

2021]

Modernizing Outer Space Governance

87

States must partner to confront the growing threat in cyber and outer space. 166
There is no alternative, as satellite security is essential to protecting people’s
livelihoods across the United States. 167
b.

Education

Novel education approaches for a skilled workforce will be crucial in facing
the space security threat. 168 As space security threats are constantly evolving,
awareness across all business sectors is needed. 169 Bringing space security and
cyber education programs to the future leaders of the US is also a key
component to national security. 170

The United States will lead and strengthen enduring international partnerships
to preserve and sustain space for future activity and so that all nations and all
people can benefit from space and improve our way of living on Earth and in
space.
166 See Shammas & Holen, supra note 20, at 10.
Wilbur Ross, President Trump’s Secretary of Commerce, eagerly supported the
private space industry by pushing the dismantling of regulatory frameworks.
As Ross emphatically stated, ‘The rate of regulatory change must accelerate
until it can match the rate of technological change!’ He also spoke before the
National Space Council, commenting appreciatively that ‘space is already a
$330 billion industry’ that was set to become a ‘multitrillion-dollar one in
coming decades’. He noted that private corporations needed ‘all the help we
can give them’ and said it was ‘time to unshackle business activity in space.
167 DEF. SPACE STRATEGY SUMMARY, supra note 28 (“Space is vital to our Nation’s
security, prosperity, and scientific achievement. Space-based capabilities are integral to
modern life in the United States and around the world and are an indispensable component
of U.S. military power.”).
168 U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N., supra note 89, at 43.
The challenge of achieving effective security and defense in cyberspac depends
on people as much as it does on technology or policy . . . [o]verall government
approaches to successfully deepen and diversify [the] candidate pool should
include: (1) [d]eveloping programs to bring in new employees via
apprenticeships, promoting cooperative study, andexpanding training programs
so that existing workers can enhance their career trajectories; (2) [r]esearching
and implementing measures of competency alongside more commonly used
certifications; (3) [s]treamlining processes and reducing institutional barriers to
onboarding cyber talent quickly; and (4) [i]dentifying opportunities and
building hiring pathways for members of underrepresented communities.
169 See id. at 8, 19, 43.
170 See id. at 18–19. Space security is paramount as a countermeasure to weapons in
space, as is the protection of the communication between satellites and their ground stations.
New ideas to better safeguard satellites and the ground stations must be sought in light of
cyberattacks initiated terrestrially but with impacts 20,000 miles above. This is a whole new
subset of security and law that is ripe for creative ideas. Id.
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Innovation

The word innovation comes from the Latin word “innovare,” which means
“to renew or restore.” 171 Today is the day to renew the approach to space
governance. The United States’ strength is innovation, and thus, it can find the
solutions to security in space and cyberspace, so the world is stronger and
more prepared. 172
d.

Space Governance

Even if the increased collaboration, education, and innovation take root,
because of the heightened interest in and review of this changing space
landscape, all could be naught without a corollary update in the space
governance (legal) paradigm. 173
In summary, all these areas need concurrent investments. 174 By
collaborating, educating, and innovating, 175 some limited protective measures
can be developed, but all nations need to be prepared that it may not be
enough. 176 There must be key renewed focus in updating laws and treaties,
along with focused investments in all cybersecurity and space security
disciplines so that peace on earth and in space is preserved. 177 Now, more than
171 Innovate, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/
word/innovate (last visited May 12, 2021).
172 See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 67, at 1, 13.
173 Id. (commercializing space is a $330 billion industry); see Shammas & Holen, supra
note 20, at 7–8 (“In this respect, outer space is ideal: it is boundless and infinite. As Earth
comes to be blanketed by capital, it is only to be expected that capital should set its sights on
the stars above.”).
174 See Shammas & Holen, supra note 20, at 10; EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 67, at 1, 13.
175 See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 67, at 10–11 (“The primary goals of
space professional development are to achieve mission success in space operations and
acquisition; stimulate innovation to improve commercial, civil, and national security space
capabilities; and advance science, exploration, and discovery.”)
176 U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N., supra note 89, at 24.
[T]he U.S. government collaborates with the private sector to reduce
vulnerabilities and deny benefits to adversaries. The strategy for this layer of
deterrence is to force adversaries to make difficult choices regarding resources,
access, and capabilities. When U.S. vulnerabilities are reduced and adversaries
are forced to expend more resources, burn sensitive accesses, or utilize unique
and expensive cyber weapons to achieve their desired results, cyberattacks will
be reduced. Actions in this layer include, but are not limited to, expanding
operational collaboration between government and private sector, prioritizing
support to systemically importantcritical infrastructure . . .
177 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 67, at 3–4.
The United States considers the space systems of all nations to have the right to
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ever, the space security and cybersecurity realms intersect. 178 The Outer Space
Treaty did not anticipate such threats and technological advancements.
Signatories to the Outer Space Treaty will begin demanding greater protection
or assurances.
IV. CONCLUSION—THE INFLECTION POINT IS NOW
This research on the Outer Space Treaty raised issues of relevance,
questionable modern-day application, as well as enforcement gaps. 179 Due to
the proliferation of space assets, the proliferation of nation states and
individuals engaged in space activity, and sophisticated technological
advancements in satellite and space technology, space governance is now
definitely valued. 180 However, the current construct may not fit the bill. 181
Because weapons launch is not solely tethered to the earth, and China and
Russia have both successfully tested anti-satellite capability from space, 182
effective space governance must evolve. 183

178

179

180
181
182
183

pass through and conduct operations in space without interference. Purposeful
interference with space systems, including supporting infrastructure, will be
considered an infringement of a nation’s rights. Consistent with the defense of
those rights, the United States will seek to deter, counter, and defeat threats in
the space domain that are hostile to the national interests of the United States
and its allies. Any purposeful interference with or an attack upon the space
systems of the United States or its allies that directly affects national rights will
be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our
choosing.
U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N., supra note 89, at 33.
Finally, the National Cyber Strategy should articulate a framework for how the
U.S. government should put the approach into operation that is organized
around six pillars: reform the U.S. government’s structure and organization for
cyberspace, strengthen norms and non-military tools, promote national
resilience, reshape the cyber ecosystem toward greater security, operationalize
cybersecurity collaboration with the private sector, and preserve and employ
the military instrument of power.
NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 14, at 1.
Over the past two decades, an emergent China and a resurgent Russia
developed advanced technologies [and now] [p]otential adversaries are
developing and proliferating anti-satellite capabilities supported by an array of
sensors to characterize and target space systems. Multiple attack options (e.g.,
cyber, electronic, or directed-energy weapons; anti-satellite missiles; or spacebased weapons) enable potential adversaries to achieve a range of damaging
effects.
Id. at 2–3.
See id. at 2.
See Shammas & Holen, supra note 20, at 2.
U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N., supra note 89, at 19.
The United States thus stands at a strategic inflection point. While America
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The weaponization of space via weapons launched in space to attack other
assets in space was once unthinkable and certainly not anticipated in 1967
when the Outer Space Treaty was passed. 184 As a result, the treaty signatories
should demand renewed talks to negotiate a more comprehensive and
unambiguous governance regime. 185 With obvious research and testing
activities by China and Russia that appear to have the sole objective of space
dominance over all others, threats to nations’ satellites and sovereignty exist. 186
If a country can unilaterally assert dominance and control in space, it naturally
follows, then such superiority can or will follow on earth.
With these increased adversarial capabilities, all space assets need assurance
of protection, especially the US, which owns the highest number of
satellites. 187 The US and other signatories can call for a review of the Outer
Space Treaty with the aim of updating it to ensure the safety of earth and space
for the next fifty years. 188 Americans should expect no less.

looks forward to the potential of cyberspace and associated technologies to
improve the quality of human life, threats continue to grow at an accelerating
pace. America is facing adversary nation- states, extremists, and criminals that
are leveraging emerging technologies to an unprecedented degree (emphasis
added).
184 See NAT’L AIR & SPACE INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 14, at 2.
185 See Krause, supra note 11 (asserting that “unfortunately, there are a number of key
treaty phases that remain opaque”).
186 Jonathan Marcus, UK and US Say Russia Fired a Satellite Weapon in Space, BBC
(July 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53518238.
187 See O’Callaghan, supra note 152 (cautioning US military leaders on the risk of sitting
idle, General Raymond stated, “The United States, in coordination with our allies, is ready
and committed to deterring aggression and defending the Nation, our allies and vital U.S.
interests from hostile acts in space.”).
188 Durkee, supra note 24, at 714 (citing Gabrynowicz, supra note 37, at 739) (Professor
Gabrynowicz agrees that perhaps we are at an inflection point, and that “future
commentators may look back to this moment to mark the dawn of a new era in space
governance.”).

